Profiles
Same format for every project — strengths and weaknesses alike. Enbox goes first because it is the
subject of this page, not because it wins.
The subject
Enbox
Research preview
enboxorg · Bun/TypeScript · Apache-2.0 · repo
The direct successor to Block's Web5: when Block shut down its TBD division in 2024, one of
Web5's lead architects (and the co-chair of the DWN working group at DIF) continued the work as
Enbox, sharing much of the same code. It is a Decentralized Web Node (DWN) stack: a high-level
SDK with typed protocols, a headless auth layer, an agent runtime with an encrypted identity
vault and bidirectional sync, and a self-hostable multi-tenant DWN server with SQL backends.
Apps define portable record schemas and access rules; users hold DIDs (did:dht by default) and
choose their DWN endpoints; records marked encryptionRequired are encrypted at the
DWN layer, and sync converges data across a user's devices and permitted apps.
In practice: build on it if you want apps with private, structured, per-user
data that follows the user across devices and can be shared with specific people — and you can
tolerate a young stack. Don't build on it yet if you need SLAs, a managed service, or mobile SDKs.
Strengths
- Encryption at rest is a protocol feature, not an app afterthought — the clearest design differentiator in this field now that Verida and Fission are gone.
- Not a from-scratch rewrite: it continues years of Web5/dwn-sdk-js engineering by its original architects, and it shows in the parts that were finished first (typed protocols, subscriptions, sync).
- Portable identity without a central directory: did:dht needs no Bluesky-style plc.directory equivalent.
- Multi-device sync, offline-capable queries, live subscriptions, and delegated, revocable read grants are built into the agent, not left to each app.
- Self-hostable server on standard SQL (SQLite/MySQL/PostgreSQL); Apache-2.0 throughout.
Weaknesses
- Self-declared research preview: preview nodes can be wiped, and the README itself says not to store sensitive or irreplaceable data. No external security audit — though that is true of every protocol-level PDS stack on this page; the honest gap versus ATProto and Solid is production mileage, not audit badges.
- The DWN specification is a stalled DIF draft whose original steward shut down in 2024. Its co-chair now develops it in practice inside Enbox — which also means spec and implementation live in one org, with no independent second implementation to keep it honest.
- One small organization; bus factor is real and there is no ecosystem of third-party apps or hosted nodes to fall back on. The Web5 shutdown is itself the proof of what happens to this design when its steward walks away.
- Bun/TypeScript only — no Kotlin, Swift, Go, or Rust SDKs, so mobile and non-JS stacks are out.
- Permission revocation is enforcement-on-sync: a revoked grantee keeps access until the revocation record reaches them. Key recovery and identity UX are unproven with real users.
- No adoption numbers to point to — it is a bet, not a network.
Still standing
AT Protocol PDS
Active · production
Bluesky Social PBC · TypeScript/Go · MIT/Apache-2.0 · atproto.com
The personal data server of the AT Protocol: each account is a signed repository — a Merkle Search
Tree of records typed by Lexicons — hosted on a PDS of the user's choice, with did:plc/did:web
identity, OAuth 2.1 authorization, CAR-file export, and a designed account-migration flow.
Third-party apps write their own Lexicon collections into the same repo, so it functions as a
general (if public-oriented) personal data store, at production scale.
In practice: the only real option today for apps where user data is public or
semi-public (social, publishing, reviews, events) and needs to reach an existing audience.
If your data must be private from the host, look elsewhere.
Strengths
- The only PDS here with mass adoption: tens of millions of accounts, independent infrastructure (Blacksky, alternative relays), and repos pushed daily.
- Best-in-class exit story: CAR export plus documented account migration, including the "credible exit" path from an uncooperative host.
- Self-hosting is genuinely first-class — Docker installer on a cheap VM.
- Self-certifying data: signed commits make records verifiable wherever they travel.
Weaknesses
- Public by design. Repository contents are unencrypted and world-readable; private data lives outside the protocol's core model, and the newer "Spaces" add access control explicitly without encryption.
- did:plc's directory is operated centrally by Bluesky PBC — a known and acknowledged centralization point.
- Spec governance sits with Bluesky PBC; there is an IETF draft but no completed standard.
- federation is real but Bluesky's Relay/AppView dominate in practice; non-social use cases are early.
Solid
Active
ODI / Inrupt · TypeScript (CSS) · MIT / commercial · solidproject.org
Tim Berners-Lee's web-decentralization protocol: users keep data in "pods" (Linked Data containers),
apps request access rather than holding the data. Identity is WebID + Solid-OIDC; access control is
WebACL or ACP; the open-source Community Solid Server (MIT) is the main self-host path, with Inrupt's
proprietary ESS powering enterprise deployments — most notably the Flanders data utility Athumi.
In practice: the choice for institutional data-exchange projects (government,
credentials, consented B2B sharing) where Linked Data tooling already exists or a vendor like
Inrupt is on contract. Painful for small teams building consumer apps.
Strengths
- Strongest institutional backing in the field: ODI stewardship, a W3C working group (Linked Web Storage), and a real government-scale deployment in Flanders (diplomas, credentials, health-research consent).
- A decade of spec work and multiple independent server implementations.
- Web-native: everything is a dereferenceable URI, so pod data links into the broader web.
Weaknesses
- Pods are plaintext to the pod operator — privacy from your host is contractual, not technical. Encrypting client-side breaks the server-side Linked Data features that justify Solid in the first place.
- RDF/Linked Data imposes real developer cost; there is no server-side query layer, so apps cache and index client-side with no transactional guarantees.
- Authorization is per-resource, not per-field; app interoperability remains largely aspirational.
- Still not a W3C Recommendation — the LWS working group missed its charter deadline and was extended into 2027. The headline "6.5M Flemings" is an addressable population, not measured active users.
Cozy Cloud
Active · new owner
Linagora · Go + JS · AGPL-3.0 · cozy.io
A French personal cloud that aggregates your data — bank statements, utility bills, health records —
via sandboxed "konnectors" into one per-user server, with apps for files, photos, contacts, and a
zero-knowledge password manager (Cozy Pass, Bitwarden-compatible). The original company went through
receivership (2024) and judicial liquidation (Feb 2025) before Linagora acquired the assets in a
court-supervised sale (May 2025); development continues under the Linagora org.
In practice: the most complete "pull your life into one place" product —
bank/utility/health aggregation plus files and passwords. Best fit if you're in its French
market; the aggregation connectors are its real moat.
Strengths
- The most consumer-complete product here: aggregation, apps, sync, and a password manager in one stack.
- Cozy Pass is genuinely zero-knowledge; konnectors run sandboxed server-side with per-doctype permissions.
- Self-hostable (Go + CouchDB, Docker) and AGPL — survived its own company's death, which says something about open licensing.
Weaknesses
- Corporate near-death: liquidation and acquisition is a reminder that the hosted service depends on a small company's fortunes; it is now being folded into Linagora's Twake suite.
- Only the password vault is end-to-end encrypted — files and doctypes are plaintext to the server; credentials handed to konnectors have a controlled server-side decryption path.
- Primarily a French-market product; smaller ecosystem than Nextcloud.
- Identity is an instance account, not a portable identifier — leaving your host means exporting, not pointing your identity elsewhere.
remoteStorage
Active · low intensity
Volunteer community · JavaScript · MIT · remotestorage.io
The oldest open protocol in the list (2011, "unhosted" movement): unhosted web apps store per-user
JSON documents on a server of the user's choice, discovered via WebFinger from a user@host address,
authorized by OAuth bearer tokens scoped per data category. Deliberately minimal — a folder tree,
ETags, and a /public subtree.
In practice: perfect for small single-user web apps — notes, bookmarks,
kanban — where you want zero backend and users bring their own storage. Anything needing
queries, sharing, or privacy from the host outgrows it immediately.
Strengths
- Radically simple — a developer can understand the whole protocol in an afternoon, and apps genuinely are unhosted.
- Fifteen years of continuity; spec still moving (IETF draft-27, June 2026) and client still releasing.
- Multiple independent servers (Armadietto, php-remote-storage, 5apps hosted).
Weaknesses
- No encryption at the protocol level — your storage provider reads everything.
- No queries, relations, or sync semantics; per-category bearer tokens are the entire permission model.
- The 2.0 client rewrite has been in beta for years; the ecosystem is a niche enthusiast circle.
- Armadietto, the main community server, has no license file — a real adoption hazard.
Perkeep
Intermittent
Volunteer community · Go · Apache-2.0 · perkeep.org
Brad Fitzpatrick's "personal storage system for life" (née Camlistore): content-addressed blobs with
a schema layer of permanodes and signed claims, importers for third-party services, full-text search,
and optional age-encrypted blob storage. Single-user by design — it is a vault for one person's
lifetime of data, not a multi-tenant app backend.
In practice: a personal archive for technical users — photos, files,
service exports — not a platform other apps build on. Think of it as infrastructure for
your data, not user data in general.
Strengths
- Architecturally principled: content addressing, signed claims, and optional client-side encryption that keeps the server blind.
- Self-hosting is the whole point — a single Go binary; v0.12 added Tailscale/tsnet for private networking.
- Influential design; 7k+ GitHub stars.
Weaknesses
- Sporadic maintenance: a five-year release gap (2020–2025), 400+ open issues, and no predictable cadence.
- Single-user model — no meaningful multi-app permission system; sharing is per-item links.
- For technical users only; there is no app ecosystem writing to your Perkeep.
Meeco
Active · commercial
Meeco Planet Pty Ltd · Proprietary · meeco.me
Sydney-based enterprise company (founded 2012) selling verifiable-credential infrastructure (SVX)
and a zero-knowledge, end-to-end-encrypted digital vault. Aligned with eIDAS 2.0 / EUDI Wallet and
the MyData movement; the rare PDS-era company that is unambiguously alive — because it went
enterprise and proprietary rather than open protocol.
In practice: what you buy when an enterprise or government needs verifiable
credentials and an encrypted vault with contracts attached — not something an indie app
developer builds on.
Strengths
- Solvent, active, and aligned with the biggest regulatory tailwind in identity (eIDAS 2.0).
- Genuine zero-knowledge vault with enterprise key management and certifications (ISO 27001).
Weaknesses
- Proprietary SaaS — "self-hosting" means an enterprise contract, not a docker-compose file; no open protocol or community.
- Focused on credential exchange rather than a general app-data store for arbitrary applications.
Gone, dormant, or pivoted
Web5 / DWN-SDK (Block · TBD)
Abandoned upstream
was Block/TBD · TypeScript · Apache-2.0 · repo
The reference implementation of the Decentralized Web Node spec — and Enbox's direct ancestor.
Block shut down its TBD division in November 2024; the repos moved to the Decentralized Identity
Foundation org and have been dormant since autumn 2024 (not archived, but unmaintained). The DWN
spec remains a draft that its DIF page still calls an "active work item," despite no substantive
commits since September 2024. The engineering did not die with the division: one of Web5's lead
architects continued the same codebase as Enbox, which is where the design actually lives now.
In practice: don't start new work on the DIF repos — use Enbox if you want this
architecture, or fork knowing you'll be your own maintainer.
Strengths
- The design work is real: protocol-scoped encryption with HKDF key derivation, declarative protocols, DID-native identity — carried forward in Enbox.
- Apache-2.0 code across five language SDKs, all forkable; the multi-language groundwork (Kotlin, Swift, Go, Rust) exists for anyone who wants to revive it.
Weaknesses
- No steward, no hosted service, no maintainers — 45+ open issues on dwn-sdk-js with no one to triage them. The permissions protocol and sync were the pieces left unfinished when funding vanished.
- A cautionary tale for the whole category: even a well-funded effort from a public company can vanish in a quarterly letter.
Fission (WNFS / UCAN)
Shut down Apr 2024
was Fission Codes Inc. · TS/Rust/Haskell · Apache-2.0
Vancouver startup building user-owned-data infrastructure: UCAN capability tokens and WNFS, an
encrypted, content-addressed file system on IPFS with a genuinely zero-knowledge private partition.
The company shut down in April 2024 (founder-confirmed); the domain is dead. UCAN outlived it —
the community working group maintains v1.0 in production use at Storacha — while WNFS itself has
no active maintainer.
In practice: of historical and design interest only. If you need
capability-based auth, use UCAN via the community working group; the storage layer is gone.
Strengths
- Proved zero-knowledge hosting could be a polished developer experience, and produced UCAN — the one artifact here that escaped its company's death.
Weaknesses
- The polished DX depended on the hosted service, which died with the company; file-centric model never grew a structured-data app ecosystem.
Ceramic / ComposeDB
Pivoted 2025
3Box Labs → Recall Labs · Rust/JS · MIT · Ceramic One
The dominant "Web3 data" stack of 2021–2023: DID-authored, append-only signed event streams, with
ComposeDB's GraphQL models on top. 3Box Labs merged with Textile into Recall Labs (Feb 2025), then
pivoted to an AI-agent token network and deprecated js-ceramic and ComposeDB (Apr 2025), shutting
down the hosted anchor service. The Rust node, Ceramic One, survives as MIT open source with
best-effort maintenance.
In practice: Ceramic One is usable for public, verifiable event streams if
you're willing to self-host and self-maintain. The productive developer platform (ComposeDB)
no longer exists.
Strengths
- Elegant stream/reconciliation protocol (Recon); Ceramic One runs with no dependency on the company's infrastructure.
- Honest, well-documented deprecation with migration guidance — a more graceful exit than most.
Weaknesses
- The company left personal data entirely; ComposeDB apps were told to migrate or break.
- Streams are public by default — encryption was always the app's problem.
- The ecosystem (Orbis, Geo, Passport stamps) largely died or migrated with the pivot.
Verida
Unresponsive
Verida Pty Ltd · TypeScript · ISC · GitHub org
Australian project offering encrypted, user-owned document databases scoped per application
"context," with NaCl keys held by the user, CouchDB-style replication between storage nodes, and a
mobile Vault app — architecturally the closest recent sibling to Enbox's encrypted-data thesis.
As of September 2026: repos stale since February, all project domains fail DNS resolution, and the
VDA token trades near zero. No formal shutdown notice was found, but the project appears to have
quietly collapsed.
In practice: don't build on it. Its encrypted-per-context data model was
genuinely good — Enbox is the living place to get that architecture now.
Strengths
- Showed real demand for the encrypted-per-context data model — its data connectors into Google/Fitbit/Strava were genuinely useful.
Weaknesses
- Token-funded economics didn't sustain the network; custom did:vda method tied identity to a chain ecosystem; adoption stayed grant-driven.
- Disappearing without a shutdown notice strands users — the exact failure mode personal data stores are supposed to prevent.
Personium
Dormant
Personium Project (Fujitsu origin) · Java · Apache-2.0 · personium.io
MyData-aligned open-source PDS server from Fujitsu Labs: a "cell" per person containing per-app
"boxes," WebDAV for files and OData for structured data, with PKI-signed tokens for cross-cell
access. Won MyData Operator awards in 2020–21; last release November 2022, core repo untouched
since March 2023.
In practice: superseded. Its cross-cell trust ideas remain worth reading for
anyone designing PDS-to-PDS federation.
Strengths
- Sophisticated cross-cell trust model, years ahead of most; real government/enterprise pilots in Japan.
Weaknesses
- Dormant and effectively unmaintained; heavyweight Java/Tomcat + Elasticsearch stack; never gained international developer traction (91 stars).
digi.me
Dormant · unclear
Digi.me Ltd · Proprietary · digi.me
One of the original commercial PDS plays (founded 2009 as SocialSafe): a client-side-encrypted
"personal data library" with user-held keys and consent-based sharing to apps. The consumer app was
discontinued years ago in a B2B pivot; the website is live but public activity is minimal, and the
company's current operating status could not be verified as of September 2026.
In practice: a B2B consent-sharing vendor, not a platform you can adopt —
and its long arc (consumer PDS → enterprise pivot → quiet) is the category's business-model
lesson in miniature.
Strengths
- Historically credible: health-data integrations, an Icelandic health-records pilot, and a real consent architecture with zero-knowledge design.
Weaknesses
- Fully proprietary platform; consumer product gone; no self-hosting, no open protocol — users depend entirely on the company's continued existence.
Adjacent — the practical alternative
Nextcloud
Active
Nextcloud GmbH · PHP/Go · AGPL-3.0 · nextcloud.com
Not a PDS, but the thing most people actually deploy when they want their data back: a self-hosted
file sync and collaboration suite. Included because any honest comparison has to admit that for
"my files, my server," the boring incumbent wins today.
In practice: if your actual need is files, photos, calendars, and collaboration
under your own roof, deploy this and stop reading comparison pages. It does not give apps a
structured, permissioned data layer over user data — which is the one thing everything else
on this page is trying to do.
Strengths
- Massive deployments, mature apps, huge ecosystem, and a sustainable company. It works, today, at every scale from Raspberry Pi to government.
Weaknesses
- File-centric, not a structured app-data store; identity is a server account that doesn't travel with you; and the trust model is admin-centric — whoever runs the server can typically read the data, with E2E encryption covering only designated folders.